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ABSTRACT
In seeking to answer the question ‘who should be included in ﬁsheries
co-management?’, a constructive critique of the existing co-management
literature is provided by ﬁlling the gaps of Habermas’s deliberative theory of
democracy with Dewey’s pragmatism. Three conditions for ensuring demo-
cratic co-management are extrapolated from the theories: actors’ authority
over decision making (empowerment), actors’ diversity (membership), and the
right to self-nomination (procedures for external inclusion). The theoretical
insights developed are supported with two examples of co-management
institutions for inshore ﬁsheries in the UK: Scottish Inshore Fisheries Groups
(IFGs) and English Inshore Fisheries Conservation Authorities (IFCAs).
KEYWORDS Procedural justice; co-management; deliberative theories; pragmatism; inshore ﬁsheries
institutions; UK
Introduction
Both academic literature and policy forums have celebrated the co-
management of environmental resources for increasing legitimacy and
eﬀectiveness, so democratising environmental governance. Fisheries
co-management is in many ways the archetypal co-management case
study (see, e.g., Pinkerton 1989, Wilson et al. 2003, Bown et al. 2013).
This is because the overexploitation of ﬁsheries resources is often linked to
the commons character of the sea, to unclear property rights regimes, to
governments’ ﬁnite resources, and to monitoring and enforcement
challenges. This has led numerous academic and practitioner communities
in the past three decades to advocate and implement institutional solutions
based on the sharing of responsibility between government and local actors
(e.g. McCay and Acheson 1987, Pinkerton 1989, Pomeroy and Berkes 1997,
Plummer and FitzGibbon 2004). In response, many countries around the
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world have implemented policy solutions towards ﬁsheries co-management,
particularly in small-scale ﬁsheries (Wilson et al. 2003, Borrini-Feyerabend
et al. 2004). Over the years, there have been many assessments of co-
management using case studies to highlight examples of success and failure,
and to make conceptual constructive criticisms, strengthening the co-
management approach theoretically and empirically. Here, we engage
with these conceptual critiques and develop them further by shedding
light on the question of who should be involved in ﬁsheries co-manage-
ment. We do this with reference to Habermasian deliberative democracy
and Deweyan political pragmatism, both of which are broadly compatible
with a process-oriented approach to co-management.
We support these theoretical insights with reference to two examples of co-
management institutions for inshore ﬁsheries in the UK: Scottish Inshore
Fisheries Groups (IFGs) and English Inshore Fisheries Conservation
Authorities (IFCAs). Comparing the two inshore ﬁsheries institutions shows
that, though not perfect, IFCAs constitute a best-practice example for IFGs.
Thus, we oﬀer a theoretical contribution by rethinking co-management draw-
ing on the insights of Habermas and Dewey, as well as policy lessons for
ﬁsheries co-management using the comparison between IFCAs and IFGs.
Co-management of environmental resources
In recent decades, scholars have come to view co-management as a key
element for both legitimate and sustainable governance of natural
resources. The literature on co-management is vast and varied, but the
key deﬁnitional trait of co-management is local empowerment, achieved
through the sharing of power and responsibility for environmental govern-
ance between the state and local resource users (Berkes and Preston 1991,
Berkes 2002).
In pushing for the integration of local resource users’ knowledge and
perspectives into decision-making processes, co-management allows actors
to take into account the richness of local knowledge (Jentoft et al. 1998,
Armitage et al. 2011), and can also increase buy-in from local resource
users. This makes enforcement of regulations easier, therefore improving
environmental outcomes (Sandström et al. 2014). However, the aim of
co-management scholars is not only functional, as the importance of co-
management has been emphasised from a normative and political perspective.
We focus here on this latter angle. From a normative perspective, participa-
tion in management becomes a right and a tool of empowerment for other-
wise marginalised voices, rebalancing unequal power relationships by
broadening the interest groups involved in decision making (Huitema 2009).
However, one risk when thinking about co-management is to simplify
the concept of the ‘local resource user’. This is particularly problematic
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when it comes to local institutions, with the idea of local resource users is
often used interchangeably with, inter alia, private (as opposed to public)
actors, and with the term – and idea of – a community (Carlsson and
Berkes 2005).
Scholars have made critiques of this kind since the late 1990s (Agrawal
and Gibson 1999). They point out the problems caused by this simpliﬁca-
tion of key concepts, discussing the many faces of communities and state
and the actors in between. They suggest that co-management is instead best
conceptualised not as a formal inter-scalar partnership, but as an iterative,
collaborative problem solving process (Plummer and Baird 2013). Taking a
process approach to studying co-management, Carlsson and Berkes (2005)
argue, means not just accepting the necessity of management collaboration
between the state and local resource users, but also looking more closely at
the participants involved, the linkages between them, and the problems they
are trying to solve.
Many studies of co-management have traditionally equated the ‘local
user’ with those who have a direct economic interest in the resource,
ignoring the question of whether a wider range of actors should potentially
be included at the local level. Mikalsen and Jentoft (2001) point this out in
reference to local ﬁsheries management in Canada, Norway, and the USA.
Fisheries co-management, they argue, is traditionally based on a too-narrow
conception of who has an interest in the resource, recognising only direct,
economically aﬀected resource users – ﬁshers – as having the right of
inclusion in making collaborative management decisions. Mikalsen and
Jentoft (2001) deﬁne this direct, economic approach to stakeholder inclu-
sion as ‘corporatist’. Such a corporatist approach consists in privileging a
particular user group (ﬁshers) over others in environmental decision
making, circumscribing therefore the demos. Using stakeholder theory,
they suggest a number of other interested groups who should be included,
from ﬁsh processors and indigenous peoples to consumers of the ﬁnal
product.
Following Mikalsen and Jentoft (2001), we argue that the constitutional
question of who should be included in ﬁsheries co-management deserves
more attention in the ﬁsheries co-management literature, and a stronger
theoretical grounding.
Co-management and public good: who should have a stake in
ﬁsheries management?
The corporatist practice of including only direct resource users in the
co-management process is based on a very narrow idea of who is, and
who should be, involved, i.e. only those with a direct economic stake in the
management of the natural resource in question. The tradition of
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seeing ﬁshers as the only relevant interests in local ﬁsheries management is
particularly common, and is likely couched in the physical nature, and legal
history, of the sea. The ocean has traditionally been the archetypal arena of
open access, and is a vast, remote mare nullius to many (Steinberg 2001).
In recent years, however, there has been a shift in the attitude toward the
relationship between human communities and the sea. This has stemmed
partly from resource scarcity and fears about the threat to oceanic eco-
systems and environments, and partly from the legal reconﬁguration of the
ocean, especially with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS solidiﬁed the relationship between wild ﬁsh
and the state, granting 200 nm of national jurisdiction over living oceanic
ﬁsh through exclusive economic zones, and opening up new legal questions
about our collective rights and responsibilities over the marine
environment.
Co-management institutions: how should diﬀerent actors be chosen?
The procedural question of who co-managers are – and who decides who
co-managers are – is therefore vital for democracy. This is of course a
central question of political democratic theory, but it remains underex-
plored in the ﬁsheries co-management literature.
As the introduction mentioned, Mikalsen and Jentoft (2001) have
attempted to discuss the important issue of inclusion in co-management
of marine resources. They point out the lack of engagement with constitu-
tional level questions in the co-management literature and seek to answer
the vital ‘who’ question when it comes to co-management. Using stake-
holder theory as developed in the ﬁeld of corporate governance, the authors
consider the question, inter alia, of stakeholder identiﬁcation. To decide
who is a legitimate stakeholder, they propose the drawing of a stakeholder
map that identiﬁes diﬀerent stakeholder types and the legitimacy of their
claims.
Although Mikalesen and Jentoft’s paper is one of the ﬁrst in the co-
management literature to address the key issue of wider democracy and
inclusion explicitly, they oﬀer no discussion of the constitutional politics of
how this stakeholder map is drawn, and by whom. We argue that this is a
vital aspect of the democratic process, with signiﬁcant implications for both
procedural justice and the substantive environmental outcomes of subse-
quent management decisions. Some actor(s) must make the decision as to
who gets a say, and the way they go about it will have ramiﬁcations
throughout the management process. Here, we provide insights into this
by forging a link between co-management, deliberative democracy, and
pragmatism.
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Deliberation and democracy
A key literature that has signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced how we think about
political participation is deliberative democracy, i.e. democracy as produced
by rational communication of actors under circumstances of inclusive
equality. Deliberative democracy departs from a liberal understanding of
democracy: i.e. democracy as a competitive process where pre-existing,
individual, and ﬁxed interests are balanced and aggregated in legislative
and policy processes to satisfy the majority. Habermas’s proceduralist
approach, based on communicative reason, ﬁgures as one of the most
inﬂuential strands of deliberative democracy (Habermas 1987, 1996).
For Habermas, communicative reason, in contrast to practical reason, ‘is
inscribed in the linguistic telos of mutual understanding’, rather than based
on substantive prescriptions (Habermas 1996, p. 4). Habermas argues that
at the root of deliberative democracy there should be institutional arrange-
ments allowing all those aﬀected by particular decisions to assent as parti-
cipants in rational discourse.
‘According to discourse theory, the success of deliberative politics
depends not on a collectively acting citizenry but on the institutionalization
of the corresponding procedures and conditions of communication’
(Habermas 1996, p. 298). The essential aspects of deliberative democracy
are therefore procedural, regarding the setting of conditions facilitating
deliberation.
Habermas’s deliberative theory explicitly addresses the importance of
inclusion for the democratic outcomes of the political process, stressing
that for a deliberative process to be legitimate, all potentially aﬀected actors
should be included (Habermas 1990). Habermas deﬁnes ‘those aﬀected’ as
‘anyone whose interest are touched by the foreseeable consequences of a
general practice regulated by the norm at issue’ (Habermas 1996, p. 107).
This is important because the consensus-building nature of deliberation,
and the vital public legitimacy it aims to produce, depends upon including
all relevant views. Inclusion is therefore a fundamental principle of delib-
erative democracy, giving to the procedural approach a substantive starting
point.
Wide and varied inclusion makes the identiﬁcation of who should be
involved a diﬃcult task, and Habermas does not discuss the practical means
by which all relevant deliberants should be identiﬁed and nominated. If
those with a right to contribute to deliberation are so disparate, how should
these groups be identiﬁed? It is easy to imagine that the powerful (yet
unrecognised) actor drawing the stakeholder map that Mikalsen and Jentoft
(2001) recommend might overlook (either through ignorance or for speci-
ﬁcally political reasons) key actors who have a justiﬁable claim for inclusion
in decision making, and whose perspectives are vital for holistic and
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legitimate environmental governance. Young (2000) terms this problem as
‘external exclusion’– the purposive or inadvertent exclusion of segments of
society from decision-making fora. These segments can be, for example,
women, working classes, or ethnic minorities who ought to be included but
are not due to structural inequalities, i.e. inequality of powers and resources
that disable their access to the deliberative process.
But even assuming structural inequalities do not exist, or that there is a
concerted eﬀort to make sure they are not determinant of who can parti-
cipate, forms of external exclusion can nevertheless manifest themselves.
This is because it may be diﬃcult for the individuals designing the co-
management institution to identify who has a justiﬁable claim to be con-
sidered a participant. To address such practical aspects of external inclu-
sion, we therefore consider the pragmatist philosophy of John Dewey, and
his particular understanding of the constitution of the public.
Deweyan approaches to public participation
A number of writers view the pragmatist philosophy of Dewey as oﬀering
potential solutions to the pitfalls of deliberative democracy (Bohman 2004,
Caspary 2008, Pappas 2008). McAfee (2004) argues that adopting a
Deweyan pragmatist approach means approaching deliberation as the inte-
gration of multiple, partial perspectives on a problem to identify a solution
that might work. This approach is problem focused, and explicitly seeks
(short term and open to change) solutions, rather than ideals.
This ‘integrative’ model of deliberation, MacAfee argues, more accurately
represents the way people actually think about and approach politics – as a
range or series of problems to be solved. Deliberators are not expected to be
selﬂess, moral individuals, working from a ‘view from nowhere’ outside of
their own positions in order to achieve inter-subjective truths. Instead,
through the self-representation and the consideration of others’ diﬀerent
personal concerns, deliberators learn about the multiple facets of any given
problem, and the potential outcomes for all of any suggested solution. The
consideration of the potential eﬀects of suggested solutions across multiple
user groups should create a practical, embedded public consciousness
among deliberators that did not need to exist prior to the deliberation
process.
Such a pragmatic approach to deliberation is explicitly Deweyan because
it is based on his idea of an emergent public. A public, argues Dewey
(2012), is not a pre-existing category of people that can be called upon to
participate in political processes. It is instead an assembly of people called
into being by the problem of being aﬀected by actions that are beyond their
individual control. Any problem with wide-ranging consequences thus
6 M. PIERACCINI AND E. CARDWELL
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creates its own public, as people express their interest in ﬁnding an accep-
table solution to that problem.
A Deweyan public, then, ﬁts in with the modern approach to a more
issue-based political engagement (Held 2004), and has a mutually constitu-
tive relationship with the issues in question: not only is the public emergent
through the deliberative, democratic process, but the process itself is emer-
gent from the concerns of the people that spontaneously identify as a public
in response to perceived problems (Marres 2007). This conceptualisation of
pragmatic deliberation can both address the issue of external exclusion of
members of this public, as we argue below, and also sit well with the more
process-oriented approach to co-management, in which emergence and
problem solving are seen as a deﬁnitional trait of success (Carlsson and
Folke 2005).
If we accept, following Dewey (2012), that a public is an emergent
manifestation of all those people aﬀected by the indirect consequences of
actions, then this means that an emergent public should contain all the
relevant stakeholders – all those with a justiﬁable interest – to be included
in co-management. Thus, following Dewey, we can add another key ele-
ment to co-management: the right for members of the public to emerge and
self-identify in response to a problem that they see as aﬀecting them, and
create of themselves an interested public. This suggests that potential co-
management stakeholders should be allowed to self-nominate, rather than
only being chosen by an external body.
This is necessary not just from a democratic standpoint but because full
representation of an issue across the range of aﬀected parties is a necessary
prerequisite for successful substantive outcomes for deliberation. If, as
McAfee (2004) argues, the personal positions of those involved in the
deliberative process largely bound the solutions arrived at around the
co-management table, it is important that these personal positions are as
inclusive as possible, so that potential solutions can suﬃciently consider all
variables.
Obviously, a huge, borderless management group would be unwieldy
and impractical, so some selection process from within this pool of appli-
cants may be necessary. To ensure democratic accountability and eﬀective
deliberation, any selection should be based on the criteria that the co-
management group covers as wide a range of interests as possible, and
selection is founded upon the principles of transparent, publically accoun-
table selection criteria with a duty to give public reasons for non-selection.
Therefore, from the above discussion, we can extrapolate three main
elements leading to legitimate ﬁsheries co-management: empowerment
(from classical co-management literature), deliberants’ diversity (from
Habermas), and ways to limit external exclusion by giving the opportunity
to members of the public to self-nominate (from Dewey). The sections
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below discuss these three key elements of co-management in relation to
inshore ﬁsheries in England and Scotland, thereby testing the democratic
potential of these institutions.
Why inshore ﬁsheries management in England and Scotland?
To ground the theoretical points raised above, we now compare two ﬁsh-
eries co-management institutions in the UK: IFCAs in England and IFGs in
Scotland. The (currently) partial devolution of power in the UK means that
England and Scotland present a valuable opportunity for comparative
analysis. We undertook this research as part of a larger project, funded by
the Economic and Social Research Council, on marine governance and
marine protected areas in the UK, running from 2012 to 2015.1 The
comparison is partly based on a desk-based analysis of policy documents
on the IFCAs and IFGs.
The project has also involved an element of primary qualitative research
including semi-structured interviews with ﬁshermen, regulators, environ-
mental non-governmental organisations, and statutory nature conservation
bodies in selected case studies in England and Scotland in order to explore
questions of marine conservation governance. As the pool of interviewees
also included IFCA and IFG representatives and the interviews touched
upon, inter alia, institutional questions related to inshore ﬁsheries manage-
ment, we reinforced our arguments with face-to-face interviews and e-mail
correspondence carried out with representatives sitting on ﬁve diﬀerent
IFCAs (Isles of Scilly, Sussex, Kent and Essex, Northumberland, and
Devon and Severn) and three representatives covering all six IFGs. It is
important to point out that this paper is primarily the outcome of desk-
based analysis rather than empirical research, so that the interviewees’
quotations cited below only support the desk-based work but do not
constitute the main source from which the comparative analysis is drawn.
To preserve the anonymity of the interviewees for ethical reasons, we have
omitted names and dates of the interviews in the quotations below.
Empowerment: institutional diﬀerences between IFCAs and IFGs
The Westminster and Scottish Governments respectively established both
IFCAs and IFGs with the mandate, familiar to co-management scholars, of
including local actors in ﬁsheries management. The Scottish IFGs were
introduced in 2009, ﬁrst running through a pilot project (Scottish Inshore
Fisheries Groups 2015). Following this pilot, the Scottish Government
changed some boundaries on the establishment of the IFGs proper, but
the remit of the groups remained broadly the same (Scottish Inshore
Fisheries Groups 2013). This remit is ‘[t]he development and
8 M. PIERACCINI AND E. CARDWELL
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implementation of regional policies and initiatives relating to the manage-
ment and conservation of inshore ﬁsheries, and eﬀects on the marine
environment . . . and the maintenance of sustainable ﬁshing communities’
(Scottish Inshore Fisheries Groups 2015).
In England, the Government introduced IFCAs in 2011, based on sec-
tions 153–158 of the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 (MCAA). IFCAs
are widely aligned to the pre-existing Sea Fisheries Committees (SFCs),
which had been in place to manage inshore ﬁsheries in some areas since the
1960s (Phillipson and Symes 2010). The switch from SFCs to IFCAs
included a formalisation of the national mandate of these regional groups,
some boundary changes, and, most importantly, the explicit inclusion of
wider ecosystem conservation in the groups’ management duties and aims.
Section 153 of the MCCA states that:
(1) [IFCAs] must manage the exploitation of sea ﬁsheries resources in that
district. (2) In performing its duty under subsection (1), the [IFCA] must –
(a) seek to ensure that the exploitation of sea ﬁsheries resources is carried out
in a sustainable way, (b) seek to balance the social and economic beneﬁts of
exploiting the sea ﬁsheries resources of the district with the need to protect
the marine environment from, or promote its recovery from, the eﬀects of
such exploitation.
There are 10 regional IFCAs around the coast of England, and six regional
IFGs in Scotland. The devolution of power is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for IFCAs
and IFGs. Whereas IFGs can only advance management recommendations to
Marine Scotland, IFCAs are statutory bodies that have the power to set local
by-laws and have enforcement powers (such as criminal prosecution or
ﬁnancial penalties for non-compliance). Nevertheless, by-laws are not eﬀec-
tive until conﬁrmed by the Secretary of State (MCCA, s 153(3)), and the
Secretary of State has the power to revoke and amend provisions related to
any by-law (MCCA, s 159(1)). The Secretary of State, however, can do so only
if he is satisﬁed that the provisions in question are ‘unnecessary, inadequate or
disproportionate’, and, before doing so, he must notify the IFCA in question,
as well as consider any objections it made (MCCA, s 159(2)), and may even
hold a local inquiry (MCCA, s 159(3)).
Therefore, though IFCAs are not the masters of their own destiny as
their decisions are subject to the approval of the Secretary of State, they
have statutory powers and responsibilities that IFGs do not hold. Unlike
IFGs, IFCAs also have permanent oﬃces and members of staﬀ. IFGs, in
comparison, meet only four times annually, although they can convene
time-limited subject-speciﬁc working groups, which will consider issues
and make recommendations to the main group.
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Deliberants’ diversity: stakeholder selection in IFGs and IFCAs
Committees run both IFCAs and IFGs. The memberships of these are,
however, determined diﬀerently. The Scottish Government initially chose
the IFG members, but once the IFGs were established, the local groups had
the power to choose any new member internally, subject to vetting by the
IFG national co-ordinator (who centrally co-ordinates all IFGs). The IFG
constitution, created by the Scottish Government, states that IFG member-
ship should be limited to: representatives of ﬁshermen’s associations with a
membership of at least 10 UK licenced vessels, from which group one
member must ﬁsh in the IFG area (Association Members) – although
IFGs do have the power to admit representatives of associations with a
smaller membership should they see ﬁt; owners, skippers, or crew of a UK-
registered ﬁshing vessel that is not a member of a ﬁsherman’s association
but ﬁshes in the IFG area (Individual Members); and, with national
guidance, any other representatives of legitimate commercial ﬁshing inter-
ests that operate in the area. As this group of local resource users then
collaborates with the Scottish Government (through Marine Scotland) to
suggest local management priorities, it ﬁts into the traditional corporatist
deﬁnition of co-management outlined by Mikalsen and Jentoft (2001).
Any potential co-managers have to lodge IFG applications with the local
co-ordinator of the IFG in question. In the event of a refusal of member-
ship, applicants can appeal the local IFG co-ordinator’s decision to the
national IFG co-ordinator. Every three years, IFG co-ordinators should
review their local membership, with any member who no longer meets
the membership criteria having their membership terminated. Members
can appeal this decision to the national co-ordinator.2 The decision-making
process of IFGs is therefore an internal one, with little mechanism for
external accountability.
IFCA membership, in comparison, is partly determined by local councils
and partly centrally determined, with no input from the existing IFCA
committee. IFCAs are thus less self-determining than IFGs are but, as we
will see below, more accountable and more open to new participants. Each
IFCA must have representation from any local council that is within their
inshore ﬁsheries and conservation area. These members are democratically
elected councillors who are then assigned to the IFCA by the council in
question. IFCAs must also have representation from those national agencies
concerned with ﬁsheries and conservation: the Marine Management
Organisation (MMO), the executive body of the UK Government
Department of Environment, Food and Rural Aﬀairs tasked with managing
the marine environment; Natural England (England’s statutory nature
conservation body); and the Environment Agency. Other prospective
members self-nominate for membership; a central group including
10 M. PIERACCINI AND E. CARDWELL
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representatives of DEFRA, the MMO, and the Secretary of State assess their
application and then interview these applicants.
The MCCA, s 151(2) states that potential IFCA members should be ‘(a)
persons acquainted with the needs and opinions of the ﬁshing community
of the district, and (b) persons with knowledge of, or expertise in, marine
environmental matters’. Section 151.9 gives further explanation of who can
self-nominate: ‘the “ﬁshing community” means all persons with any sort of
interest in the exploitation of sea ﬁsheries resources or in ﬁsheries for such
resources; “marine environmental matters” means – (a) the conservation or
enhancement of the natural beauty or amenity of marine or coastal areas
(including their geological or physiographical features) or of any features of
archaeological or historic interest in such areas, or (b) the conservation of
ﬂora or fauna which are dependent on, or associated with, a marine or
coastal environment’.
Guidelines have been developed by the MMO (2015) regarding self-
nomination criteria. These guidelines are far broader than those of the
IFGs, with anyone with knowledge of or interest in ﬁshing and the envir-
onment open for consideration for IFCA membership. According to the
Secretary of State for the Environment and Rural Aﬀairs (Hansard, 4 March
2011: Column 608W), the MMO selected all IFCA appointees against three
main criteria, which are pulled from a broad and inclusive basis: an active
interest and involvement in the local community; a passion for making a
positive diﬀerence in the local area; and excellent communication, inﬂuen-
cing, and participation skills. The outcome of these diﬀerent membership
stipulations can be seen in Table 1, which lists the diﬀerent interest groups
represented across Scottish IFGs and English IFCAs, respectively.
Perhaps one of the most interesting products of the diﬀerent limitations on
membership and degree of openness to self-nomination is the large amount of
Table 1. Committee/board membership representation across
Scottish IFGs and English IFCAs by sector.
Sectoral representation IFGs IFCAs
Commercial ﬁshing (mobile) ✓ ✓
Commercial ﬁshing (static) ✓ ✓
Recreational ﬁshing ✗ ✓
Environment ✗ ✓
Marine science ✗ ✓
Marine social science ✗ ✓
Aquaculture ✗ ✓
Archaeology ✗ ✓
Marine tourism (including sailing and diving) ✗ ✓
Estuarine management ✗ ✓
Ports and harbours ✗ ✓
Sales and processing ✗ ✓
IFGs, Inshore Fisheries Groups; IFCAs, Inshore Fisheries Conservation
Authorities.
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representational doubling up in the Scottish local groups. In England, very few
people sit on more than one local IFCA. The only instances of multiple
membership relate to two MMO representatives and an EA representative
whose districts encompass more than one IFCA. There is no doubling up of
representatives from other interest groups. In Scotland, however, representa-
tives of large ﬁshermen’s associations have multiple local seats, with some
sitting on every single local group (see Table 2).
Limiting external inclusion: emergence of the marine public in IFCAs
and IFGs
Both IFGs and IFCAs allow some measure of self-nomination to co-man-
agement. However, by strictly limiting the potential membership of IFGs to
representatives of the ﬁshing industry – and only allowing commercial
ﬁshermen, and particularly ﬁshermen’s associations, to self-nominate –
the Scottish IFGs limit the true opportunity for marine publics to emerge,
and the deliberative potential of the co-management institution. Instead,
they take the traditional corporatist resource-user approach to co-
management. This corporatist stance is particularly notable when we
consider that almost all local IFGs represent the same national interest
groups as well as local interests. In England, in comparison, IFCAs recog-
nise far wider claims to participate.
The Scottish Government’s Strategic Framework for Inshore Fisheries
in Scotland, which laid the framework for IFGs in 2005 (Scottish
Government 2005), recognises the validity of a broad range of stake-
holders in marine management, stating that ‘ﬁshermen must be at the
core of the groups. Commercial ﬁshing activity can, however, impact on
and be impacted upon by other factors. It is essential, therefore,
that other stakeholders have an opportunity to be involved in the
process. The nature of these stakeholders . . . may include processors,
Table 2. Multiple memberships across IFG co-management organisations.
Sits on 6 of
6 pIFGs
Sits on 5 of
6 pIFGs
Sits on 4 of
6 pIFGs
Sits on 3 of
6 pIFGs
Sits on 2 of
6 pIFGs
2 (18% of
average IFG
ex. com.)
2 (18% of average
IFG ex. com.)
2 (18% of average
IFG ex. com.)
2 (18% of average
IFG ex. com.)
3 (27% of average
IFG ex. com.)
Both national
mobile gear
organisations
Both regional
ﬁshing
organisations
One regional
ﬁshing
organisation, one
national mobile
gear organisation
One regional
organisation, one
national static gear
organisation
All regional
ﬁshing
organisations
Number of individuals (representing organisations) with a seat on multiple pilot* IFG executive
committees. (The average size of executive committees is 11 members.)
*Two pilot IFGs have since been merged into a single IFG. Orkney operates with a management group
rather than an IFG and is not included in this analysis.
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environmental interests, community members, and other marine users’.
Despite this, these stakeholders are not allowed to nominate themselves
to and participate in the IFG. Instead, they can only be invited onto an
advisory group by the IFG’s executive committee.
Although the advisory group must involve representatives of certain
national organisations, such as Scottish Natural Heritage and Scottish
Environmental Protection Agency, the IFG has no duty to consider the
wider local community (such as local environmental interests or recrea-
tional ﬁshers and divers); potential local stakeholders cannot self-
nominate, but must be invited to join. Furthermore, the mandated
role of the advisory group is weak: the constitution states that the
IFG should consult the advisory group on any ‘material decision’, but
does not specify how the materiality of a decision should be decided, or
to what extent the advisory group members’ opinions, once solicited,
should be taken into account by the IFG committee (Scottish
Government 2010).
The limited view of who can participate in co-management in the
Scottish IFGs has signiﬁcant democratic implications. The small demos
allowed for by the IFG remit produces a notable ‘doubling up’ of power,
with the same individual heads of ﬁshing associations participating in
management all around the Scottish coast (Table 2). The democratic deﬁcit
implicit in this is particularly notable if one considers that many of these
groups will also have political access to policymaking processes at the
national level, leading to multiple ‘votes’ for a small number, whilst other
interested stakeholders are sidelined.
In the English IFCAs, by comparison, very few individuals hold seats on
more than one IFCA, with a wider range of interests represented both
within and across IFCAs in response to the diﬀerent publics in diﬀerent
regions. According to the information the government provides for appli-
cants, MMO-nominated members are chosen according to the breadth of
their experience and their capacity to represent the wider community,
something that IFCA appointees backed up:
I was appointed by the MMO [to the IFCA] as a ﬁsherman . . . I mean they
wanted to know that I was a hotelier as well, therefore I was a businessman
and, you know, that I wasn’t just banging a drum for ﬁshermen, I had a scope
of things to hopefully bring to the IFCA. (Isles of Scilly Fisherman and IFCA
member, extract from interview April 2014)
Around the table in a committee meeting you are not meant to bring any
particular viewpoint, or anything that will ostracise any member. So let’s say
if I was coming from a particularly conservation point of view, if I was always
seen to be just pushing that, and not have the interests of the ﬁshing industry
at heart as well, that would be quite isolating. (Sussex IFCA member with a
conservation background, extract from interview July 2014)
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The Scottish corporatist approach denies many self-identifying publics
the opportunity to participate in co-management. One such example is
recreational ﬁshers, who are not included in the IFG remit. Across the
English IFCAs, in comparison, all the co-management organisations have
recreational representation.
Another example of an emergent public that has been denied a say in
the co-management of IFGs by the Scottish Government’s selection
criteria are local community charities and conservation groups. The
charity Arran COAST has approximately 1600 members, mostly based
on the island of Arran oﬀ the west coast of Scotland. For more than two
decades, COAST, a community group, has researched and campaigned
on behalf of the environmental health of their local inshore seas. In
2008, after a long campaign, Arran COAST achieved Scotland’s ﬁrst
(and currently only) no-take zone, in an area of Lamlash Bay to the
south of the island. In 2014, COAST spearheaded and provided scientiﬁc
evidence for the South Arran marine protected area (MPA). South Arran
is now the only community developed and nominated Scottish MPA in
existence, which covers an area of more than 250 km2 in the Firth of
Clyde.
Despite this long-term involvement in the marine environment, which
is an arguably strong justiﬁcation to be considered a legitimate stake-
holder in local marine management, the Scottish Government have
consistently denied Arran COAST a seat in the south-west IFG commit-
tee. The thwarted potential of self-nomination means that many self-
identiﬁed marine publics feel themselves excluded from the IFG
co-management process. The doubling up of membership, and multi-
plications of power that this produces, has also led to feelings of internal
exclusion for other members of IFGs, who feel that the national, large-
scale ﬁshermen’s associations with seats across the IFGs have undue
power in the co-management process. In the words of one IFG member:
‘It’s the same people being represented in all the IFGs. It’s unfair,
unreasonable and unworkable’ (e-mail correspondence with IFG
member, July 2014).
This limited inclusion means that the process of deliberative emergence
is stilted in the IFG co-management fora. In comparison, members of the
English IFCAs often reference this emergence, and are widely supportive of
this aspect of group deliberative processes:
[G]radually it’s shifted from being a Fisheries Committee which had a lot of
input from ﬁshermen to really something much bigger than that. It’s more of
a, I suppose it’s gone into the wider community now . . . they do consult more
with the ﬁshermen, but they also consult with the hobby ﬁshermen. So
everybody is treated the same really. (Isles of Scilly, Fisherman, not an
IFCA member, extract from interview, April 2014)
14 M. PIERACCINI AND E. CARDWELL
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [1
09
.15
4.1
77
.53
] a
t 0
6:5
3 1
2 M
arc
h 2
01
6 
We did have some quite healthy debates in terms of, you know, ﬁshing versus
various other kind of protection of wildlife particularly, and you can see the
vested interest in ﬁshermen. And I think it makes them look at things I think
a bit more holistically rather than just being kind of narrowly focused on just
kind of catching ﬁsh. (Sussex Local councillor and IFCA member, extract
from interview, July 2014)
In respect of IFCAs . . . I feel that we are excellent examples of “environ-
mental democracy”, as can be gathered from, for example, our Annual Plan
on our website showing we have a wide range of stakeholders who are
involved in decision making and setting policy. (Northumberland IFCA,
e-mail correspondence June 2015) (Table 3).
Implications
The above discussion of IFCAs and IFGs clearly shows that although both
institutions are built on co-management premises, the IFCAs are more
attuned to a pragmatist deliberative approach to democracy. This is because
they are more empowered (e.g. they can make by-laws and have enforce-
ment powers), include a wide range of stakeholders, and some of these
stakes are allowed to emerge as such through processes of self-nomination
that are not conﬁned to a particular industry. Diﬀerently, the corporatist
approach of IFGs, their purely consultative role, and the participation of the
same individual heads of ﬁshing associations in more than one IFG repre-
sent the problem of elite capture (Stack 2014). A small number of actors can
exploit the procedural opening of the system in order to dominate decision
making.
Table 3. Comparative summary.
IFGS IFCAs
Empowerment Can advance management
recommendations to Marine Scotland
Statutory powers to make by-laws and
enforce law subject to approval by
Secretary of State
Deliberants’
diversity
Low diversity:
(1) Representative of ﬁshermen’
association
(2) Owner, skipper, or crew of UK ﬁshing
vessel (not within ﬁshermen’s
association)
(3) Other representatives of legitimate
commercial interests
High diversity:
(1) Representative of Environment
Agency
(2) Representative of MMO
(3) Representative of Natural England
(4) Councillors
(5) MMO appointees
External
inclusion
Marine Scotland provides chair for each
IFG and determines initial membership.
Changes to membership will be made
with the agreement of the Group,
subject to review after 18 months.
All members must be representatives
of commercial ﬁshing interests only.
Anyone acquainted with the needs and
opinions of the ﬁshing community in the
district or has knowledge of
environmental matters can apply to
becoming an MMO nominee.
Orders establishing IFCA district can
specify appointment rules, subject to
approval by Secretary of State.
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Although IFCAs are more in line with a pragmatist approach to
democracy, there is nevertheless some room for improvement. This is
clearly visible in relation to MMO (the national management body)
nominees. The MMO’s guidelines (2014) for IFCA candidates state that
the application process is transparent, fair, and open, in line with the
Nolan Principles (Committee on Standards of Public Life 1995). There
are two phases in the selection process: applicants need to submit an
application form, and then, if shortlisted, a local interview will take
place. The application form is, however, a highly complex competency-
based application that may put oﬀ many applicants. Also, MMO nomi-
nees are subject to a heavy form of vetting by the MMO and DEFRA,
and there is no room for public scrutiny of the process. There is no
duty to give reasons for the decision or to publicise it. Candidates can
receive feedback if they request it, but this is not publicly available.
Considering the emphasis on selecting the candidates based on their
local knowledge and involvement, the opinion of the wider public could
and should here operate as an important accountability check. Besides,
the MMO guidelines do not include a review process to scrutinise
MMO nominees’ performance. However, as they hold a public oﬃce,
their performance should be assessed to be in line with the account-
ability principle of the Nolan List. To compensate for this oversight, the
MMO is now requesting existing IFCAs nominees who are close to the
end of their mandate to step down and, if they so wish, re-nominate
themselves.
Second, the fact that IFCAs members are partly chosen centrally and
partly determined by local councils means that the members’ selection
process (with the exception of MMO nominees) does not maximise
IFCAs’ openness and democratic character. These weaknesses, coupled
with the issue mentioned above of the need for the Secretary State’s
approval for local by-laws and exercise of enforcement powers, do not
make IFCAs ideal embodiments of local empowerment and democracy.
Overall, however, IFCAs more fully meet the three conditions necessary for
democratic co-management, namely extent of actors’ authority over deci-
sion-making (empowerment), extent of actors’ diversity (membership), and
the right to self-nomination (procedures for external inclusion), and are a
better example of pragmatic deliberation than IFGs, which represent a very
narrow interest group. Furthermore, the IFGs’ self-determination due to the
internal selection of new applicants could be seen as problematic because
there are no mechanisms of external accountability.
The aim of the IFCAs is to achieve a balanced membership, with the
MMO nominees chosen being those that bring to the deliberation table a
variety of interests reﬂecting the economic, social, and environmental remit
of the IFCAs. Considering IFCAs from a pragmatic deliberation viewpoint,
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we have reached diﬀerent conclusions from earlier academic critiques of the
institutions. More speciﬁcally, Appleby and Jones (2012) argued that the
involvement of commercial ﬁshing and environmental interests in IFCAs
was problematic from a constitutional viewpoint because of the conﬂict of
interest between these bodies. However, such argument is based on a
narrow understanding of stakeholder status and not on a deliberative
understanding of democracy. At the core of deliberative democracy, there
is the idea that a wide variety of interests should be included and that these
are not ﬁxed but are negotiated and transcended during the deliberative
process. Conﬂicts of interest are more likely to occur if the decision-making
process is conceived as a battleground between rigid interests rather than as
a space setting the institutional conditions for personal and collective
development.
Following Dewey, the conditions for this development must include the
self-nomination of members of the emerging public. If Habermasian the-
ories stress that deliberation must be as inclusive as possible, allowing all
those aﬀected to participate, they remain silent on the individuation pro-
cesses of those aﬀected when there are no clear interest groups to start with,
but these emerge as problems occur. It is only with our reading of Dewey
that we found an answer: inclusion of publics should be premised on self-
nomination so that the aﬀected interests can fully emerge through a process
of self-reﬂection and positing in relation to a particular issue. Importantly,
this requires personal motivation and commitment to deliberate. Finally,
the co-management potential of these institutions can be fully realised only
if they have authority to exercise decisions, if their opinions matter, and, in
this sense, the classical co-management focus on empowerment remains a
central point.
The above empirical examples show that self-nomination is a funda-
mental starting point for ensuring procedural justice in co-management,
and a necessary prerequisite for the success and legitimacy of any delib-
erative process. The ﬁsheries co-management literature, however, has not
always fully taken this into account. Instead, it tends to focus on simply
moving decision-making powers towards users at the local level, without
any thought as to who has a ‘right’ to power, who might be excluded, and
who should decide this. As the diﬀerent approaches and outcomes of the
IFG and IFCA co-management bodies outlined above show, the selection
processes for co-managers have signiﬁcant consequences for both democ-
racy and justice.
Conclusion
We have oﬀered a fresh take on ﬁsheries co-management, drawing on
deliberative democracy and pragmatist theory. We have argued that the
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classical co-management literature, though it importantly puts local actors’
empowerment centre stage by advocating the sharing of power between
state and local users, pays insuﬃcient attention to the way the demos
involved in decision making is formed.
Habermas and Dewey have helped us to move from the traditionally
scalar co-management approach to a process-based analysis, and to
argue that environmental democracy needs to rest on pragmatic delib-
eration. Vitally, this must begin with the self-constitution of the co-
manager as a deliberant through transparent and accountable processes
of self-nomination that attempt to minimise obstacles such as elite
capture. Without this, the outcomes of co-management risk being both
undemocratic and ineﬀective. We have argued that there are three vital
prerequisites for any co-management process to be truly democratic:
level of empowerment (powers and duties of the institutions), extent of
deliberants’ diversity, and the right to self-nomination in order to limit
external exclusion.
Using the example of the governance of inshore ﬁsheries in the UK, we
have shown how the three key elements of co-management identiﬁed
(empowerment, inclusiveness of membership, and procedures allowing
self-nomination) are more developed in England than they are in
Scotland. Future studies could explore whether our ﬁndings can be
validated empirically across all the IFCAs and IFGs, and if the same
patterns occur in the co-management of other environments and natural
resources, such as commonly owned forests, grasslands, and freshwater
ecosystems.
Notes
1. Grant n. ES/K001043/1. PI: Margherita Pieraccini. See project website at:
http://www.ecologiesandidentities.com/, last accessed 17 December 2014.
2. The IFG constitution is given as an appendix in the IFG management
plans. See, for example, Clyde IFG Management Plan 2011 at: http://
www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0042/00422314.pdf, [online] accessed 4
June 2015.
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